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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The following are parties to the proceedings: 
1. Petitioner/Appellant Jay niSearle; 
2. Respondents/Appellees Boyd and Dorothy Searle; 
3. Other persons and entities mentioned are the Fort Peck Assiniboine and 
Sioux Tribe and its counsel Gary Beaudry, whom are not parties in the Third 
District Court case. These persons and entities participated in the proceedings 
before the Third District Juvenile Court and the Fort Peck Tribal Court. While 
Appellant makes references to them in her brief and serves copies of the brief 
upon Mr. Beaudry, Appellee does not include them because they did not 
intervene in the Third District Court case. 
u 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
CASES iv 
STATUTES iv 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
A. Nature of Case . . . . . . 3 
B. Course of Proceedings . . . . . 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. THE APPELLATE COURT MUST AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BECAUSE 
THE MOTHER FAILED TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT. . 7 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR BECAUSE RES 
JUDICATA BARRED ENFORCEMENT OF AND CONTEMPT 
FOR DISOBEDIENCE OF THE MAY 22,1998 TRIBAL 
COURT ORDER 8 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION . . . . 11 
A. The Motion to Set Aside Judgement was timely because 
the mother's own Entry of Judgment provided that the 
i i i 
foreign judgment was given full faith and credit on August 
25,1999 and the motion was brought within three months 
of the order. . . . . . . . 12 
B. Appeal of the timeliness of the motion is frivolous under 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
should be sanctioned. . . . . . 14 
C. Sufficient grounds must be presumed because the mother 
failed to provide a transcript demonstrating there were 
insufficient grounds to set aside under Rule 60(b). . 15 
D. The mother did not preserve for appellate review the 
issue of Rule 60(b) grounds. . . . . 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
IV 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468,476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). . . . 2,12 
Borberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). . . . 17, 
BJH v. State of Utah ex rel H.R. & B.R., 945 P.2d 158 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) 10 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937,938 (Utah 1993). . . 2,11 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318,1319 (Utah 1987). . . . 9 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,434-36 (Utah 1993). . . . 11 
Hartv. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) . 17 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). . . . 1 
Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1999). . . . 1 
King v.IndustrialCommission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,1285. . . 8,9,16 
Kunzler v. 0"Dell, 855 P.2d 270,275 (Utah Ct App. 1993). . . 2,11 
Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1982). . 11 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987) 11 
Pendeletonv. Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 1996). . . 2 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932 (Utah 1 9 9 8 ) . . . 1 
Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104,106 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 9,16 
Trimble Real Estate v.Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451,453 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 10 
Scarf v. BMG Co., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 198). . . . 9,16 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990) . . . . 2 
State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998) . . . . 17 
State in the Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 158,162 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) . 10 
Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338 (Utah 1999) 1 
STATUTES 
U.S. Const., Amend. 5,14 . . . . . . . 3 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7 3 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 24 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et. seq. (1998) 3 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 . . . . 3 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5) . . . 3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) . . . . 3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 . . . . . 3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 . . . .2,3,6,11,12,15-17 
vi 
JURISDICTION OF "I HE COURT 
The Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction over this appeal of a fina.' 
order of the ' 1 1 rird District Court ii i;v o l K ii i.g don lesticatioi i ai i,d ei i forcen iei i t • : i a 
f o i * p i « > • ' m e Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
: ^ - . -. i 'K i ^- '• ' / 
appellees disagrt >e with Appellant's characterization of the nature of the 
issues presented lor n-xiew. More particularly Appellant orroncoush 
designates laaual and Jiscictionarv issues as ic^di issues M\d tlu -e. 
• . ' - * • • . - -c\ !r\v. Appe l lees will here inaf te r recite the 
i ssues w h i c h A p p e l l a n t p r e s e n t s for r e v i e w n o t i n g A p p e l l e e s ' pos i t ion a< V< iVv 
n a t u r e of t he i ssue a n d the a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d •>; * i * IOW. 
1. D i d the trial totiill c i r 'when .» *.V,L uea tru;: ,.\^ - jiit»nu 
1 6 1 999 Tribal "I t order was unenforceable because it 
relates to and steins from" the Mav 22, iL*% Order? 
Appellees disagree with the designation . : : ( ;^ issue as a question . : u\w, 
1
 1 1 lis issi le ii n - • :>J v e s i n ixe< 1 <; :J/I lestioi is of fact ai LCI la • • „ I 'indii igs of Fact are 
rev iewed under the clearly er roneous s tandard and will not be set aside1 unless 
they are so lacking in suppor t as to he against the ^lear w^igln , . v.e c\ idence. 
"Y i mng v V i nt. ig 979 1 > 2d 338 342. (I It:, \\ 1.1 999); I \ mningh mv. Mlstate Ins. G r 973 
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209,121-1 (Utah App I ^ - ) ; 
Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. (hereinafter "Standard of Review"). Conclusions of 
law are reviewed for coi rectness. 1 /< ran // v I U nvi // 806 I l" 2d 1 209 , 1! 2,1 1 (I Jl c ill i 
1 
App. 1991); Pendeleton v. Pendeleton, 918 P.2d 159,160 (Utah App. 1996); Smith v. 
Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). In determining the correctness of the 
trial court's determination, the Appellate Court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
Appellees disagree that Marguiles By and Through Marguiles v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (Utah 1985) supports the designation of this issue as a 
question of law as the case provides no support for the designation. 
2. Did the trial court err in setting aside the Entry of the 
Foreign Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure? 
Appellees disagree with the designation of this issue as a question of law. 
This issue involves questions of discretion. Discretionary rulings are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 (Utah 
1994); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Kunzler v. 0"Dell, 
855 P.2d 270, 275; Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(hereinafter "Standard of Review"). 
Appellees disagree that Marguiles By and Through Marguiles v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (Utah 1985) supports the designation of this issue as a 
question of law as the case provides no support for the designation. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The legal authorities that are determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal include: 
2 
Constitutional Provisions: 
U.S. Const, Amend. 5,14 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 24 
Statutory Provisions: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l et. seq. (1998) 
Rules of Procedure: 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In addressing the issues raised by the Appeal, Respondent/Appellees, 
Boyd Searle will be referred to as "the grandfather" while Boyd and Dorothy 
Searle collectively will be referred to as "the grandparents" and 
Petitioner/Appellant, Jayni Searle will be referred to as "the mother." 
A. Nature of Case. 
This case concerns the enforceability of a foreign judgment entered by the 
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court (hereinafter "the Fort Peck Tribal 
Court") located on an Indian Reservation in Poplar, Montana. 
3 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
In February 1998, the grandparents filed in the Third District Juvenile 
Court (hereinafter "the Juvenile Court") a Petition to Terminate the Parental 
Rights of the mother in relation her minor child. (R 361.). The Juvenile Court 
granted temporary custody of the child to the grandparents on March 3, 1998. 
(R. 362). The mother subsequently filed in the Juvenile Court a Petition to 
Transfer to the Fort Peck Tribal Court. The Juvenile Court transferred 
jurisdiction over the pending Petition to Terminate Parental Rights to the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court (hereinafter "the Tribal Court."). (R. 333). On May 22, 1998, 
the Tribal Court issued an ex-parte temporary order accepting jurisdiction and 
transferring custody of the minor child to the mother. (R. 335). On May 28,1998 
the mother filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with the Third District Court, 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson, presiding, seeking enforcement of the May 22, 1998 
Fort Peck Tribal Court Order against the grandfather. (It is inexplicable why this 
action was commenced only against the grandfather rather than both 
grandparents, particularly since the Tribal Court Order named both 
grandparents). (R. 174). On March 8, 1999, Judge Hanson convened a hearing 
and dismissed the Petition for Writ of Assistance on grounds that the action was 
not properly filed under the Foreign Judgment Act and the Tribal Court order is 
not entitled to full faith and credit because the grandfather's due process rights 
were violated. (R. 174-177). A few weeks later, on June 15, 1999, the mother 
commenced a second action in the Third District Court (hereinafter "the trial 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The mother's failure to provide a transcript makes it impossible for the 
Appellate Court to review all the evidence and determine whether the 
challenged findings or conclusions are in error. In the absence of a transcript, the 
mother must demonstrate the conclusions are inconsistent with the findings, 
something she has failed to do. Consequently, the Appellate Court must 
disregard the arguments and affirm both the findings and conclusions. 
II. 
The trial court was barred by res judicata from giving full faith and credit 
to the October 16,1998 Tribal Court order because it continued and affirmed the 
May 22, 1998 Tribal Court order that Judge Hanson had dismissed and found to 
not be entitled to full faith and credit. 
III. 
The trial court's order granting the grandparent's motion to set aside was 
not an abuse of discretion and therefore must be affirmed. Further, the mother's 
position that the motion was untimely and that the trial court lacked sufficient 
grounds to grant the motion is unsupported by a transcript or marshalling of the 
evidence. The mother's complaint that the trial court did not enter findings as to 
Rule 60(b) grounds must not be considered by the Appellate Court because the 
issue was not properly preserved for appellate review. 
6 
court") seeking enforcement of a second Tribal Court order that specifically held 
the grandparents in contempt for noncompliance with the May 22, 1998 Tribal 
Court order which Judge Hanson had determined was entered in violation of the 
grandfather's due process rights. (R. 15-16). The grandparents filed a Response 
objecting to entry of the Tribal Court order. (R. 31). The trial court issued an 
Entry of Judgment on August 25, 1999 recognizing and giving full faith and 
credit to the Tribal Court order. (R. 68-74). On November 16, 1999, the 
grandparents filed an Emergency Motion for Stay, Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and Motion for Declaratory Judgment. (R. 151-207). On November 23,1999, the 
trial court held a hearing on the grandparents Emergency Motion for Stay and 
Motion to Set Aside. (R. 324). After hearing argument at the hearing, the trial 
court granted a stay and took under advisement whether to set aside the 
judgment. (R. 324; 445-447). The trial court issued a written ruling on February 
7, 2000, and entered an Order setting aside the Entry of Judgment on February 
25, 2000. (R. 611-615; 620-624). The trial court further set for hearing the Motion 
for Declaratory Judgment for April 2000 (R. 611-615). The mother filed notice of 
appeal on March 27, 2000 before the Motion for Declaratory Judgment was 
heard. (R. 627-633). The trial court convened a hearing on the motion for 
Declaratory Judgment and determined that since the issue was on appeal, 
hearing on the motion was no longer necessary (despite the grandparents 
objection). (R. 673). 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLATE COURT MUST AFFIRM THE TRIAL 
COURTS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS BECAUSE THE MOTHER 
FAILED TO PROVIDE A TRANSCRIPT. 
The mother's first issue asks, Did the trial court err when it concluded that the 
October 16, 1999 Tribal Court order was unenforceable because it "relates to and stems 
fromf/ the May 11, 1998 Order? This issue is improperly characterized by the 
mother as a question of law. It should be properly characterized as a mixed 
question of fact and law because the mother challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence throughout her brief and because the question hinges on whether the 
factual finding that one order related to and stemmed from another is correct. 
The Appellate Court need not reach these issues, however, because of the 
mother's failure to provide a transcript. On November 23, 1999, the trial court 
held a hearing on the Motion for Stay and Motion to Set Aside Judgment. While 
the minute entry does not accurately reflect the entire substance of the hearing, it 
indicates the issue of "the second filing of complaint77 (or the second filing for full 
faith and credit of the May 22,1998 Tribal Court order, which was the crux of the 
Motion to Set Aside) was addressed and the trial court took under advisement 
the issue "to make a determination if the court erred or if there needs to be an 
adjustment in the Court's ruling.77 (R. 324.) 
The mother's failure to provide a transcript makes it impossible for the 
Appellate Court to review all the evidence and determine whether the findings 
or conclusions are in error. The trial court's ruling must be affirmed particularly 
7 
since the mother's appeal relies heavily on her contention that the trial court 
either ignored the evidence, misread the evidence or reached conclusions 
contrary to the evidence. The mother's brief is riddled with assertions in this 
regard, for instance, 
" ANALYSIS OF THE ERROR IN THE CONCLUSION OF LAW 
(1) Court Incorrectly Entered a Conclusion Based Upon the 
Evidence" 
(Appellant's Brief, 19.) 
"...[T]he trial court's conclusion, based upon these findings and 
order, that the Custody Decree stemmed from the May 22, 1998 
Order is not supported by the facts in the record. The evidence 
presented below indicates that the trial court's conclusion fails to 
factor in the entire gambit of language in the [Tribal Court's] 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order from October 1998." 
(Appellant's Brief, 20.) 
"Additionally, the Court's conclusion is not supported by the 
evidence." 
(Appellant's Brief, 24.) 
"The trial court's findings are insufficient to form a basis upon 
which to deny enforcement under the relevant case law." 
(Appellant's Brief, 29.) 
"The Judgment should be reversed in that Appellee's failed to 
demonstrate evidence justifying relief." 
(Appellant's Brief, 32.) 
"If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such a finding or conclusion. Rule 
11 [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires counsel provide the 
appellate court all evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal." King v. Industrial 
8 
Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285; Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson, 
802 P.2d 104, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 
(Utah 1987). "A petitioner must also provide a transcript if he argues a legal 
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence in the case. Otherwise we [the 
appellate courts] have no basis on which to evaluate the findings and 
conclusions/' King v. Industrial Commission of Utah at 1285. Without a transcript, 
the Appellate Court must "review the court's legal conclusions for consistency 
with the findings." Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson at 106; Scarf v. BMG 
Co., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 198 ); King v. Industrial Commission of Utah at 1285. 
The mother undeniably argues exactly what the preceding case law holds 
must be accompanied by a transcript: that the findings or conclusions are 
unsupported or contrary to the evidence as demonstrated supra from excerpts of 
the mother's brief. In the absence of a transcript the mother must demonstrate 
the conclusions are simply inconsistent with the findings and she has failed to do 
this altogether. Consequently, the Appellate Court must disregard the 
arguments outright and affirm both the findings and conclusions. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BECAUSE RES JUDICATA 
BARRED ENFORCEMENT OF AND CONTEMPT FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
WITH THE MAY 22,1998 TRIBAL COURT ORDER. 
Judge Hanson issued an order dismissing the mother's petition seeking 
full faith and credit to a May 22, 1998 Tribal Court order on grounds that the 
grandfather's due process rights had been violated on July 26,1999. (R. 174-177). 
The mother then submitted a second Tribal Court order dated October 16, 1998 
9 
to the trial court in this matter purporting to hold the grandfather in contempt 
for violating the May 22, 1998 order Judge Hanson had found to have been 
entered without due process and seeking to uphold and continue said order. (R. 
15-16). 
Based upon Judge Hanson's findings that the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court 
order was not entitled to full faith and credit, res judicata barred the trial court 
from enforcing the October 16, 1998 Tribal Court order that found the 
grandfather had wrongfully maintained custody and continued the order. "The 
doctrine of res judicata is based on the premise that the proper administration of 
justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause/7 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Res judicata has two distinct branches. The first branch is claim preclusion, 
which bars the relitigation of claims that have been previously litigated between 
the same parties, and two, issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues 
that have been decided. BJH v. State of Utah ex rel. H.R. & B.R., 945 P.2d 158 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997.) 
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata requires three elements: "First, 
both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second the claim that 
is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one 
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit 
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." State in the Interest of T.J., 
945 P.2d 158,162 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
10 
Both claim preclusion and issue preclusion apply to this case because the 
same parties and the same issues pertaining to transfer of custody and the 
validity of the May 22,1998 Tribal Court order were before the trial court. Judge 
Hanson irrevocably decided the issues on July 26,1999. Therefore the trial court 
in this matter had no choice but to deny giving full faith and credit to the 
October 16, 1998 Tribal Court order which would directly contradict and 
overturn Judge Hanson's ruling regarding the earlier May 22,1998 order. Doing 
otherwise would overturn Judge Hanson's ruling and affirm the May 22,1998 in 
violation of the doctrine of res judicata after Judge Hanson entered findings that 
it was not entitled to full faith and credit. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT 
MUST BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION. 
The mother's second issue asks, Did the trial court err in setting aside the 
Entry of the Foreign Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
The mother's brief mischaracterizes this issue as a question of law. Whether a 
trial court should grant a motion for relief from judgment is a matter of 
discretion. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434-36 (Utah 1993); Mascaro v. Davis, 
741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987); Laub v. South Cent Utah Tel Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 
1306 (Utah 1982). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis 
for the decision. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 850 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A trial 
court's ruling will be reversed if the ruling is so unreasonable as to be classified 
as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 
11 
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
The mother argues that the Motion to Set Aside was untimely filed, the 
trial court erred because the grandparents failed to prove sufficient grounds 
under Rule 60 (b) and the trial court failed to make any conclusion or finding on 
Rule 60 (b) grounds. (Appellant's Brief, 30-40) None of the mother's arguments 
support abuse of discretion in granting the motion to set aside. The mother's 
arguments, improperly seeking review under the correctness standard, are 
discussed infra. 
A. The Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely because the 
mother's own Entry of Judgment provided that the foreign 
judgment was given full faith and credit on August 25, 
1999 and the motion was brought within three months of 
the order. 
Despite the fact that the Motion to Set Aside sought relief under Rule 
60(b)(3),(4),(5)and/or(6), (R. 157) and the trial court granted the motion without 
entering findings or conclusions as to grounds under Rule 60(b), the mother 
appears to request that the Appellate Court assume the motion was granted 
under (60)(b)(3) which would require filing within three months. This is the 
underlying presumption supporting her contention that the trial court erred 
because the motion was untimely. Notwithstanding this assumption, nothing in 
the record supports a determination that the motion was granted specifically 
under 60(b)(3). 
12 
Further, the mother makes the frivolous argument that the grandparents 
Motion to Set Aside filed on November 16, 1999, within three months of the 
August 25, 1999 "Entry of Judgment/' was untimely because the foreign 
judgment "obtained full faith and credit on July 15, 1999, thirty days after the 
filing on June 15, 1999." (Appellant's Brief, 31) In essence, the mother argues 
that the grandparents and the trial court should have presumed the foreign order 
obtained full faith and credit at a certain date by making a calculation. No such 
presumption or calculation was necessary, nor binding, because the Entry of 
Judgment spells out a later date when the foreign judgment was given full faith 
and credit. 
The Entry of Judgment drafted by the mother's own counsel, and signed 
by the trial court on August 25, 1999, directly states that: "the Court hereby 
recognizes and gives full faith and credit to the October 16,1998 order of the Fort 
Peck Tribal Court attached hereto. The attached order is hereby given full faith 
and credit, subject to all the enforcement provisions which govern such 
judgments." The order makes it sufficiently clear that the foreign judgment is 
"hereby" given full faith and credit on the date the order is signed by the Court. 
(See Appellant's Brief, Addenda "H," R. 68-74.) 
The second tier of the mother's timeliness argument is that, despite the 
fact that the Motion to Set Aside specifically sought to set aside an order dated 
August 25, 1999, the motion should have sought to set aside some earlier order 
and would therefore be untimely. The motion clearly sought to set aside the 
13 
August 25, 1999 order, and whether the mother believes this was the proper 
remedy that should have been requested is irrelevant on the issue of timeliness 
because there is no question that the motion was brought within three months of 
the August 25,1999 order. 
The mother's argument fails entirely to demonstrate an abuse of discretion 
regarding timeliness. Not only did the trial court NOT reach an unreasonable 
conclusion, it reached the ONLY reasonable conclusion. Moreover, even review 
of the conclusion under the inappropriate correction of error standard, the 
Appellate Court must find that trial court's legal conclusion on timeliness is the 
only correct conclusion inasmuch as it is consistent with the facts on the record 
regarding the amount of time between the August 25, 1999 order and the 
November 19,1999 motion seeking to set it aside. 
B. Appeal of the timeliness of the motion is frivolous under 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and should be 
sanctioned. 
The mother's new position, that the judgment should be presumed to 
have obtained full faith and credit on the date it was filed rather than the date the 
entry of judgment was issued, is frivolous under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because it is not grounded in fact or law. The position is 
not grounded in fact or law because the Entry of Judgment itself provides the 
date the foreign order was given full faith and credit as August 25,1999, and the 
Motion to Set Aside clearly sought to set aside that order within three months of 
entry. This position taken in the mother's brief contradicts the position taken in 
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the Entry of Judgment her counsel drafted and appears to be made in bad faith. 
The Court should sanction the mother in the amount of attorneys fees for 
bringing this frivolous appeal. 
C. Sufficient grounds to set aside must be presumed because 
the mother failed to provide a transcript demonstrating there 
were insufficient grounds to set aside under Rule 60(b) and failed 
to marshal the evidence. 
The mother argues there were insufficient grounds for the trial court to 
grant a Rule 60(b) motion. The mother frames this issue as an issue of law 
although she clearly questions the facts. The mother challenges the sufficiency of 
the facts at least twice in her brief, stating: "The trial court failed to identify 
which grounds were applicable to the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside...The 
judgment should be reversed in that the Appellee's failed to demonstrate 
evidence justifying relief/' (Appellant's Brief, 32.) "Appellant's did not 
demonstrate an adequate factual basis to support this alleged ground for relief. 
This Court can determine from the record, which is all based upon a Motion and 
Response, that the factual assertions by the Appellee would have failed to 
adequately state a claim for any relief under Rule 60(b)(3)/' (Appellant's Brief, 
40.) 
As previously set forth, the mother provided no transcript of the 
November 23, 1999 hearing where the motion was argued and taken under 
advisement. In fact, the Appellate Court defaulted the mother and set the 
briefing schedule without benefit of a transcript because she failed to file a 
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request for transcript or a notice that no transcript was necessary. In absence of a 
transcript, the Appellate Court has no basis on which to evaluate the findings 
and conclusions and must review the trial court's legal conclusions for 
consistency with the findings. Prudential Capital Group Co. v. Mattson at 106; Scarf 
v. BMG Co., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 198 ); King v. Industrial Commission of Utah 
at 1285. 
D. The mother did not preserve for appellate review the issue 
of Rule 60(b) grounds. 
The mother argues the appellate court should reverse the trial court 's 
order setting aside the August 25, 1999 "Entry of Judgment" because the trial 
court failed to make findings as to Rule 60(b) grounds. Admittedly, the trial 
court did not enter findings or conclusions as to the grounds for setting aside the 
order. However, the appellate court cannot reverse on this issue because the 
mother failed to preserve the issue for appellate review by failing to make a 
timely objection in the trial court. 
The mother had at least two opportunities to make objections and 
preserve the issue. First, the trial court issued a written ruling setting aside the 
order but made no reference to Rule 60(b) grounds. The mother did not object to 
the ruling generally nor did she object to the omission of Rule 60(b) grounds. 
Second, the grandparents' counsel prepared a proposed order containing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on the written ruling as 
instructed by the trial court. The mother did not object to the proposed order nor 
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did she object to the omission of Rule 60(b) grounds. An issue is preserved for 
appellate review when three requirements are satisfied: i) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion; ii) the issue must be specifically raised; and iii) a party 
must introduce supporting evidence or provide relevant legal authority. Hart v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The three 
requirements are intended to "put the judge on notice of the asserted error and 
allow [ ] the opportunity for correction at the time in the course of the 
proceeding/' Borberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
rational for preservation of issues is that the trial court, in fairness, ought to have 
the chance to correct its own errors. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1225-26,1227 
(Utah 1998). 
Contrary to this standard, the mother did not object and made no effort to 
notify the trial court of the alleged error, failed to provide the trial court relevant 
legal authority or the requisite opportunity to correct the alleged error. 
Consequently, the issue was not preserved and is improper for appellate review. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court must affirm the trial 
court's order and award costs and attorneys fees against Appellant's counsel in 
favor of the Appellees. ^ 
DATED this ^ day W^A , 2001. 
^vlaria Cristina Santana 
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